Video, 68 NY2d at 307 [noting that Hanlon "imposed a specific, nondelegable burden on the magistrate which required that (the magistrate), not the police, determine probable cause"]). Individuals do not cede legitimate expectations of privacy when they park a vehicle at the house of a friend, acquaintance or stranger. Our statement in that case, unrelated to specific facts before the Court, that "a warrant to search a building does not include authority to search vehicles at the premises" (id. Discipline in this area benefits not only the Supreme Court in determining its own jurisdiction, but also this Court in establishing a respected body of state constitutional law. This case presents the question whether the Fourth Amendment tolerates a dog sniff conducted after completion of a traffic stop. You already receive all suggested Justia Opinion Summary Newsletters. As a result of the search of the residence, the police found a handgun, but a separate individual (not Mr. Gordon) was charged with possession of that weapon. Before Supreme Court, the People responded by attempting to distinguish our prior decisions and arguing that, if they were distinguishable and therefore not controlling, Supreme Court should adopt the People's preferred rule interpreting the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, all of those cases either directly rely on federal case law, or rely on New York cases that turned on federal case law, in deciding the search-and-seizure issues before them (see Sciacca, 45 NY2d at 127-129; Hansen, 38 NY2d at 21-23; Dumper, 28 NY2d at 299; Rainey, 14 NY2d at 38). In People v Rainey, police officers tendered factual allegations sufficient to establish that the defendant's residence likely contained forged or illicit goods. People v Nieves, 36 NY2d 396, 400 [1975] [a person's mere presence on the premises where suspected gambling is occurring is insufficient to justify a search]). at 37). a premises) does not impliedly encompass the others. Prosecutors initially argued that the failure of listing an actual crime in the warrant was a typographical error. It is a matter of preserving rights whichall of us enjoy, and there is nobetter place to enforce those rights than in a court of law. We first held that the underlying warrant for the residence lacked sufficient factual allegations to authorize a search of the residence (Dumper, 28 NY2d at 298). at 299). The issue in Hansen was whether there was probable cause for the search warrant directed at "two separate target locations discretely described," namely a residence and an "automotive van wherever located" (id. Nevertheless, the majority insists that vehicles are special containers, arbitrarily favoring vehicles over other transportable containers, such as backpacks and rollable luggage, and containers normally located outdoors, such as mailboxes. "[I]t is highly awkward, if not impossible, to use a case as the basis for an argument about the meaning of the state constitution if it is unclear from the case itself whether the case is even about the state constitution" (James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich L Rev 761, 783 [1992]). G.R. Siegal represents John Drago who owned and operated a check cashing business, Kayla Companies. BOGGS, Justice. If, as the dissent says, trafficking in drugs provides probable cause to search vehicles, the officers can set forth the results of their investigation, describe the vehicles they have observed, and [*6]make their case to the magistrate. Rather than forthright basing this extreme position on the Fourth Amendment and application of Supreme Court precedenta decision that would theoretically be more readily reviewed by the Supreme Court (perhaps because this Court has now become an outlier and created a "split" in the interpretation of Ross)the majority relies, in some unspecified way, on our case law that not only is inapposite, but also predates Ross and was decided without the benefit of subsequent constitutional law on the import of containers located in the areas designated to be searched in warrants. We have on several occasions addressed the permissible scope of a search based on allegations of illegal activity occurring at a residence or premises (see e.g. Citing Rainey, we [*3]reiterated that under our precedent, the "scope of the search has been carefully limited" and "probable cause must be shown in each instance" (id.). Nevertheless, in our view, that does not render our repeated citations to the State Constitution meaningless. Defendant did not support that argument with any state constitutional analysis. Biden then recalled the outspoken Georgia Republican's recent allegations regarding fentanyl deaths. However, Siegal struck back with a letter to Judge Feuerstein regarding the prosecutor's intentions to pursue criminal action against Drago: In its letter, the Government has asserted that, notwithstanding the suppression of theevidence, it intends to proceed with prosecuting John [Drago]. The affidavit contained no indication as to dates, times, frequency or purpose and was open to the interpretation that other vehicles might have entered or left the premises on a nonregular basis. It was not immediately clear under what circumstances the lawyer, M. Evan Corcoran, appeared, but he has had a key role in the case examining Mr. Trumps handling of government documents. The dissent faults our prior decisions in Hansen, Dumper, Sciacca, and Rainey for failing to conduct an extensive analysis of whether state constitutional protections deviate from federal constitutional protections in this context, while simultaneously acknowledging that our state caselaw delineating that particular analysis postdates those decisions. at 402 [the "ultimate mandate of reasonableness" "depend(s) upon the facts and circumstances"]). The warrant here authorized the search of a particular van and nothing else. . Moreover, every other state high court that has addressed this issue has, like the federal courts, held that a warrant authorizing a search of the entire premises permits the police to search vehicles located thereon [FN5]. Worse still, the majority's preservation rule will have the effect of transforming those same cases, and any other cases that employ parallel citations to the State and Federal Constitutions, into seminal state constitutional decisions, irrespective of the fact that those cases are wholly devoid of any basis for concluding that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment in the context of the issues they addressed. Supreme Court granted Mr. Gordon's motion to suppress. Nor did it confront whether the van could reasonably be searched if the van was located on the residence when the van was searchedhow could it, after all, given that its opinion does not even indicate whether the van was in fact located on the residence when it was searched.[FN7]. Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. In the proceedings below, Supreme Court held that although the police had probable cause to search Mr. Gordon and his residence, the warrant did not encompass the search of two vehicles located outside the residence, and the police lacked probable cause to search those vehicles. In Hansen, we held that police officers had sufficient cause to search Hansen's residence after surveilling the residence for some time and observing pipes, scales, and other narcotics materials (Hansen, 38 NY2d at 20). We agreed, and held that "[f]or purposes of satisfying the State and Federal constitutional requirements, the searching of two or of more residential apartments in the same building is no different from searching two or more separate residential houses. In Ross, the Supreme Court held that when police officers have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of the trunk of a vehiclebased on an informant's tip that narcotics were being kept in the trunk of the carthe police may open a paper bag found inside the trunk (Ross, 456 US at 801). Get free summaries of new New York Court of Appeals opinions delivered to your inbox! His sole contention was that the search of the vehicles was outside the scope of the search permitted by the warrant, noting that the vehicles were not in an attached garage and thus not part of the home. No such connections were made here. the premises" (Percival, 756 F2d at 600; compare United States v Reivich, 793 F2d 957, 963 [8th Cir 1986] [exempting "vehicle(s) of a guest or other caller" from the permissible scope of a premises warrant] with United States v Cole, 628 F2d 897, 899-900 [5th Cir 1980] [upholding the search of a truck of a third party that arrived on the property during the execution of the premises warrant]). This Court upheld the validity of the search and seizure under Terry. Accordingly, those courts have held that, under the Fourth Amendment, "[a] search warrant authorizing a search of a certain premises generally includes any vehicles located within its curtilage if the objects of the search might be located therein" (United States v Gottschalk, 915 F2d 1459, 1461 [10th Cir 1990]; accord United States v Armstrong, 546 Fed Appx 936, 939 [11th Cir 2013]; United States v Johnson, 640 F3d 843, 845 [8th Cir 2011]; United States v Patterson, 278 F3d 315, 318 [4th Cir 2002]; Evans, 92 F3d at 543; United States v Duque, 62 F3d 1146, 1151 [9th Cir 1995]; United States v Singer, 970 F2d 1414, 1417-1418 [5th Cir 1992]; United States v Reivich, 793 F2d 957, 963 [8th Cir 1986]; Percival, 756 F2d at 612; United States v Asselin, 775 F2d 445, 447 [1st Cir 1985]).[FN4]. Wilson, J. The deponent set forth his experience, stating that he had been involved in more than 1,000 drug-related arrests, that he was familiar with the modus operandi of heroin dealers, that the activity taking place at the premises was consistent with narcotics transactions, and, based on the above, there was probable cause to believe drugs would be "found at the above described premises." However, the constitutional mandate of particularity of the place to be searched may not be circumvented by implication as the People urge. The items that could be seized in the raid were listed as; "Records, documents and materials that memorialize or reflect financial transactions between Kayla and its source(s) of cash, including, but not limited to contracts, receipts, invoices, letter, bank statements, notes, ledgers, cash receipt journals or records cash shipment records, and/or cash delivery records". Defendant's [*7]expectation of privacy in the vehicles is not disputed. For example, "a warrant that authorizes an officer to search a home for illegal weapons also provides authority to open closets, chests, drawers, and containers in which the weapon might be found" (Ross, 456 US at 821). After the House Homeland Security Committee heard testimony from a Michigan woman whose sons died after unknowingly taking the synthetic opioid in 2020, Taylor Greene tweeted a clip from the hearing. However, we held that the police lacked sufficient evidence to search a vehicle that had been seen coming and going from the residence. . The majority's "clarif[ication]" of the cases (which comes nearly a half century later), transforming them into state constitutional decisions, is nothing short of judicial legerdemain (majority op at 19). By Steve Eder,Matthew Rosenberg,Joseph Goldstein,Mike Baker,Kassie Bracken and Mark Walker. Contacting Justia or any attorney through this site, via web form, email, or otherwise, does not create an attorney-client relationship. Instead, this Court has repeatedly held that, to preserve a state constitutional argument, a defendant must specifically argue below that the New York Constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution (see e.g. In its October 2019 term, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear arguments in a case that asks whether the Fourth Amendment "always permits a police officer to seize a motorist when the only thing. I write and consult on federal criminal law and criminal justice. We cannot accept the argument that the entry into the private garage was a permissible incident of the right to search pursuant to a warrant. Siegal's argument was that such a search was a violation of 4th Amendment rights and submitted a motion toUS District Judge Sandra J. Feuerstein that any evidence gathered in the raid shouldbe suppressed. Disclaimer: Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Bumphus's Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated when the police seized his car and then delayed several days without any legitimate explanation, however small before searching the vehicle, and that The suppression of the gun recovered in the eventual search was warranted. Like Sciacca and Dumper, Hansen focused on the basic tenets of probable cause of criminal activity in the warrants at issue and did not address the question here. On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed, and we now do so as well. Moreover, to the extent to which vehicle searches are authorized in a warrant, the vehicles must be "designated or described" (CPL 690.15 [1] [b]). In this case, by comparison, the warrant application contained no mention whatsoever of the existence of the vehicles ultimately searched, much less evidence connecting them to any criminality.
