It set a very terrible precedent, which is that he would go on to escalate further, not with any striking confidence that his objectives will be achieved, but only with the assurance that, unless he embarked on these massive military escalations, America would fail in Vietnam and he might well be labeled the only president in American history to lose a war.. You've read 1 out of 5 free articles of Naval History this month. Fluoride. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident and many more recent experiences only reinforce the need for intelligence analysts and decision makers to avoid relying exclusively on any single intelligence sourceeven SIGINTparticularly if other intelligence sources are available and the resulting decisions might cost lives. A distinction is made in these pages between the Aug. 2 "naval engagement" and the somewhat more ambiguous Aug. 4 "naval action," although Marolda and Fitzgerald make it clear they accept that the Aug. 4 action left one and possibly two North Vietnamese torpedo-firing boats sunk or dead in the water. The Dollar Bill . It still is not clear whether the order was intended to halt the attack or to delay it until after nightfall, when there was a much greater chance for success. The Gulf of Tonkin incident, like others in our nation's history, has become the center of considerable controversy and debate. NSA officials handed the key August SIGINT reports over to the JCS investigating team that examined the incident in September 1964. Joseph C. Goulden, Truth Is the First Casualty: The Gulf of Tonkin AffairIllusion and Reality (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. 80. Perhaps that is the most enduring lesson from Americas use of SIGINT in the Vietnam War in general and the Gulf of Tonkin Incident in particular. Around midday on Aug. 4, Adm. Grant Sharp, the top navy commander in the Pacific, made a call to the Joint Chiefs, and it was clear there were significant doubts about this second incident. For the rest of the war they would be truly secretand in the end they were a dismal failure. Both of these messages reached Washington shortly after 1400 hours EDT. At Hon Nieu, the attack was a complete surprise. WebTo many online conspiracy theorists, the biggest false flag operation of all time was the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The North Vietnamese didnt buy the distinction; they attacked the USS Maddox. We have ample forces to respond not only to these attacks on these destroyers but also to retaliate, should you wish to do so, against targets on the land, he toldthe president. Heavy machine-gun bullets riddled PTF-6, tearing away part of the port bow and wounding four South Vietnamese crewmen, including Lieutenant Son. With this information, back in Washington President Johnson and his advisers considered their options. By then, early news accounts had already solidified some opinions, and the Johnson Administration had decided to launch retaliatory strikes. The Vietnam War buff will find it fascinating for its wealth of detail carefully set down in understated prose (a welcome relief, I might add, from the hysterical tone that marks much Vietnam War writing). At this point, U.S. involvement in Vietnam remained largely in the background. You can find out more about our use, change your default settings, and withdraw your consent at any time with effect for the future by visiting Cookies Settings, which can also be found in the footer of the site. One 12.7mm machine bullet hit Maddox before the boats broke off and started to withdraw. While many facts and details have emerged in the past 44 years to persuade most observers that some of the reported events in the Gulf never actually happened, key portions of the critical intelligence information remained classified until recently. Both boats opened fire, scoring hits on the tower, then moved on to other buildings nearby. . As such, its personnel in Vietnam were the envy of their Army counterparts in the bush since, as it was commonly put, sailors sleep between clean sheets at night (the grunts were also envious of the Air Force, where you fight sitting down). It is difficult to imagine that the North Vietnamese could come to any other conclusion than that the 34A and Desoto missions were all part of the same operation. The threat removed, Maddox retired from the area to rejoin friendly forces. WebGulf of Tonkin Resolution, also called Tonkin Gulf Resolution, resolution put before the U.S. Congress by Pres. While 34A and the Desoto patrols were independent operations, the latter benefited from the increased signals traffic generated by the attacks of the former. Sign up for The Top of the World, delivered to your inbox every weekday morning. Although McNamara did not know it at the time, part of his statement was not true; Captain Herrick, the Desoto patrol commander, did know about the 34A raids, something that his ships logs later made clear. Telegram from Embassy in Vietnam to Department of State, 7 August 1964, FRUS 1964, vol. "5, In reality there was little actual coordination between 34A and Desoto. In November of 2001, the LBJ Presidential library and museum released tapes of phone conversations with the President and then Defense In the future, conventional operations would receive all the attention. Shortly after taking office following the death of President John F. Kennedy, President Lyndon B. Johnson became concerned about South Vietnam's ability to fend off the Communist Viet Cong guerillas that were operating in the country. Just after midnight on 31 July, PTF-2 and PTF-5, commanded by Lieutenant Huyet, arrived undetected at a position 800 yards northeast of the island. Until the ICC investigation blew over a week later, the commandos camped on a small pier. Interview, authors with James Hawes, 31 March 1996. But the light helped the commandos as well, revealing their targets. During the afternoon of 3 August, another maritime team headed north from Da Nang. In this case, perception was much more important than reality.10. By late 1958 it was obvious that a major Communist buildup was underway in South Vietnam, but the American SIGINT community was ill-placed and ill-equipped to deal with it. A National Security Agency report released in 2007 reveals unequivocally that the alleged Aug. 4, 1964, attack by North Vietnam on U.S. destroyers never actually happened. On the afternoon of Aug. 2, three Soviet-built P-4 motor torpedo boats were dispatched to attack the destroyer. Gulf of Tonkin & the Vietnam War. Just after midnight on 4 August, PTF-6 turned for home, pursued by an enemy Swatow. There was no way to get a commando team ashore to plant demolition charges; they would have do what damage they could with the boats guns.3 The Gulf of Tonkin Incident famously gave the Johnson Administration the justification they needed to escalate the Vietnam War. But, interestingly, on Sept. 18, a similar incident occurred in the Gulf of Tonkin. This article is based on the PRI podcast, LBJ's War, hosted by David Brown. Here's why he couldn't walk away. (2021, February 16). Maddox detected the torpedo boats on radar at a range of almost 20,000 yards and turned away at its top speed of 32 knots. 1, Vietnam 1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 611. Hickman, Kennedy. Early Military Career IV-2 to IV-4. But for a band of South Vietnamese commandos and a handful of U.S. advisers, not much had changed. When you visit the site, Dotdash Meredith and its partners may store or retrieve information on your browser, mostly in the form of cookies. The NSA report exposes translation and analytical errors made by the American SIGINT analystserrors that convinced the naval task force and national authorities that the North had ordered a second attack on August 4, and thus led Maddoxs crew to interpret its radar contacts and other information as confirmation that the ship was again under attack. . In the days leading up to the first incident of August 2nd, those secret operations had intensified.. And so, in the course of a single day, and operating on imperfect information,Johnson changedthe trajectory of the Vietnam War. The commander also added the requirement of collecting photographic intelligence of ships and aircraft encountered, as well as weather and hydrographic information. And who is going to believe that? The Maddox was attacked at 1600. At the White House, administration officials panicked as the public spotlight illuminated their policy in Vietnam and threatened to reveal its covert roots. President Johnson ordered a halt to all 34A operations "to avoid sending confusing signals associated with recent events in the Gulf of Tonkin." Historians still argue about what exactly happened in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964. WebThe Senate passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution with only two opposing votes, and the House of Representatives passed it unanimously. After the incident, Herrick was unsure that his ships had been attacked, reporting at 1:27 a.m. Washington time that "Freak weather effects on radar and overeager sonarmen may have accounted for many reports. This was granted, and four F-8 Crusaders were vectored towards Maddox's position. In an effort to increase pressure on North Vietnam, several Norwegian-built fast patrol boats (PTFs) were covertly purchased and transferred to South Vietnam. That initial error shaped all the subsequent assessments about North Vietnamese intentions, as U.S. SIGINT monitored and reported the Norths tracking of the two American destroyers. Kennedy Hickman is a historian, museum director, and curator who specializes in military and naval history. The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, Admiral Harry D. Felt, agreed and suggested that a U.S. Navy ship could be used to vector 34A boats to their targets.6. Not reported at the time, Herrick instructed his gun crews to fire three warning shots if the North Vietnamese came within 10,000 yards of the ship. It was 1964, an election year, and the Republicans had just nominated Barry Goldwater, a former jet fighter pilot, and hardcore hawk, to run against Johnson in November. It is not NSA's intention to prove or JCS, "34A Chronology of Events," (see Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 424); Porter, Vietnam: The Definitive Documentation (Stanfordville, NY: 1979), vol. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Three days later, she rendezvoused with a tanker just east of the DMZ before beginning her intelligence- gathering mission up the North Vietnamese coast. As it turns out, Adm. Sharp failed to read to the Joint Chiefs the last line of the cable, whichread: Suggest a complete evaluation before any further actions.. https://www.historynet.com/case-closed-the-gulf-of-tonkin-incident/, Jerrie Mock: Record-Breaking American Female Pilot, When 21 Sikh Soldiers Fought the Odds Against 10,000 Pashtun Warriors, Few Red Tails Remain: Tuskegee Airman Dies at 96. Moises book, however, was based on only the few SIGINT reports he was able to obtain through the Freedom of Information Act. He is the author of. Despite this tremendous uncertainty, by midafternoon, the discussion among Johnson and his advisers was no longer about whether to respondbut how. Senator Morse was one of the dissenters. Westmoreland reported that although he was not absolutely certain why the Swatows were shifted south, the move "could be attributable to recent successful [34A] operations. Both orders were repeated, but only the latter was relayed to the torpedo boats before the attack was launched. Two hours later the Phu Bai SIGINT station transmitted a critic report warning of possible [North Vietnamese] naval operations planned against the Desoto patrol. Twenty-five minutes later, Phu Bai sent a second critic report that said, imminent plans of [North Vietnamese] naval action possibly against Desoto Mission.. President Johnson and his advisers nevetheless went forward with a public announcement of an attack. The Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the expansion of the Vietnam War that resulted in a lot of American Two days later, the Gulf of Tonkin resolution sailedthrough both houses of Congress by a vote of 504 to 2. Arguing that he did not seek a "wider war," Johnson stated the importance of showing that the United States would "continue to protect its national interests." The United States denied involvement. WebUnderground Knowledge host James Morcan discloses what really happened in 1964's Gulf of Tonkin Incident which started the Vietnam War. The Truth About Tonkin | Naval History Magazine - February 2008 Hereafter referred to as FRUS, Vietnam 1964; Congressional Research Service, The U.S. Government and the Vietnam War: Executive and Legislative Roles and Relationships, Part II, 1961-1964 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 287; Message CTG72.1 040140Z August 1964 (Marolda and Fitzgerald, p. 425). Vaccines. 8. Background intelligence on North Vietnam, its radar networks and command-and-control systems was limited. They arrived on station overhead by 2100 hours. Whats not in dispute is the aftermath: A resolution from the Senate For additional reading, see the recently declassified NSA study by Robert J. Hanyok, Spartans in the Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975; and Tonkin Gulf and The Escalation of the Vietnam War, by Edward Moise. Today, it is believed that this second attack did not occur and was merely reports from jittery radar and sonar operators, but at the time it was taken as evidence that Hanoi was raising the stakes against the United States. Within the year, U.S. bombers would strike North Vietnam, and U.S. ground units would land on South Vietnamese soil. On 3 August, the CIA confirmed that "Hanois naval units have displayed increasing sensitivity to U.S. and South Vietnamese naval activity in the Gulf of Tonkin during the past several months. In addition, the destroyer USS Turner Joy began moving to support Maddox. In Saigon, Ambassador Maxwell Taylor objected to the halt, saying that "it is my conviction that we must resume these operations and continue their pressure on North Vietnam as soon as possible, leaving no impression that we or the South Vietnamese have been deterred from our operations because of the Tonkin Gulf incidents." Thus, this is an "official" history, not an official one because "the authors do not necessarily speak for the Department of Navy nor attempt to present a consensus." The Desoto patrol continued with another destroyer, the Turner Joy (DD-951), coming along to ward off further trouble. Over the next 12 hours, as the president's team scrambledto understand what hadhappened and to organize a response, the facts remained elusive. Along with other American warships, Maddox was steaming in international waters some 28 nautical miles off North Vietnams coast, gathering information on that countrys coastal radars. He reported those doubts in his after action report transmitted shortly after midnight his time on August 5, which was 1300 hours August 4 in Washington. Until 1964, Desoto patrols stayed at least 20 miles away from the coast. PTF-6 took up station at the mouth of the Ron River, lit up the sky with illumination rounds, and fired at the security post. The first critic report from Phu Bai reached Washington at about 0740 hours, Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). As Communist communications activity was rising rapidly, American senior leaders were increasing support to the South Vietnamese government. Thats what all the country wants, because Goldwater's raising so much hell about how he's gonna blow 'em off the moon, and they say that we oughtn't to do anything that the national interest doesn't require. In 2005 documents were released proving that Johnson had fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident in order to justify attacking North Vietnam. ", "No," replied McCone. The Gulf of Tonkin act became more controversial as opposition to the war mounted. Hickman, Kennedy. Covert maritime operations were in full swing, and some of the missions succeeded in blowing up small installations along the coast, leading General Westmoreland to conclude that any close connection between 34A and Desoto would destroy the thin veneer of deniability surrounding the operations. Then they boarded their boats and headed back to Da Nang.12 WebMany historians now agree that the Gulf of Tonkin incident, in which many believed North Vietnamese ships had attacked American naval forces, may not have occurred in the way it was described at the time. At each point, the ship would stop and circle, picking up electronic signals before moving on. In turn, that means a minimum of several hundred persons were party to a plot that has remained watertight in sieve-like Washington for two decades. Naval Institute. 1. At the time, the Navy relied heavily on Naval Support Group Activity (NSGA), San Miguel, Philippines, for SIGINT support, augmented by seaborne SIGINT elements called Direct Support Units (DSUs). Mr. Andrad is a Vietnam War historian with the U.S. Army Center of Military History, where he is writing a book on combat operations from 1969 through 1973. Those same reports were shown to the select congressional and senate committees that also investigated the incident. The publicity caused by the Tonkin Gulf incident and the subsequent resolution shifted attention away from covert activities and ended high-level debate over the wisdom of secret operations against North Vietnam. . McNamara was ready to respond. Despite McNamaras nimble answers, North Vietnams insistence that there was a connection between 34A and the Desoto patrols was only natural. With a presidential election just three months away and Johnson positioning himself as the peace candidate, the administration spoke of American resolve not to react to provocation and to avoid escalation. 10. Johnsonasked for, and received, a resolution of war from the US Congress that led to further escalation in the conflict. The Health Conspiracy. Top Essentials to Know About the Vietnam War, Timeline of the Vietnam War (Second Indochina War), Vietnam War: General William Westmoreland, M.S., Information and Library Science, Drexel University, B.A., History and Political Science, Pennsylvania State University. originally appeared in the June 2008 issue of Vietnam magazine. But on 7 January, the Seventh Fleet eased the restriction, allowing the destroyers to approach to within four milesstill one mile beyond North Vietnamese territorial waters as recognized by the United States. Ogier then opened fire at 1508 hours, when the boats were only six minutes from torpedo range. 5. History is who we are and why we are the way we are.. In fact, the United States had been waging a small, secret war against North Vietnam since 1961. "Vietnam War: Gulf of Tonkin Incident." Forty-five minutes after beginning their attack, the commandos withdrew. Captain John J. Herrick, Commander Destroyer Division 192, embarked in the Maddox, concluded that there would be "possible hostile action." WebJoe Rogan interview on the 911 Conspiracy Theory. The World is a public radio program that crosses borders and time zones to bring home the stories that matter. History is a guide to navigation in perilous times. In fact, the North Vietnamese were trying to avoid contact with U.S. forces on August 4, and they saw the departure of the Desoto patrol ships as a sign that they could proceed to recover their torpedo boats and tow them back to base. He then requested the passage of a resolution "expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in Southeast Asia." 10. After 15 minutes of maneuvering, the F-8s arrived and strafed the North Vietnamese boats, damaging two and leaving the third dead in the water. Unlike McNamara, Johnson, on the morning of Aug.4,1964, was in less of a hurry to respond to an attack. North Vietnams immediate concern was to determine the exact position and status of its torpedo boats and other forces. In the meantime, aboard Turner Joy, Captain Herrick ordered an immediate review of the nights actions. By including the orders and operational guidance provided to the units involved, the study develops the previously missing context of the intelligence and afteraction reports from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident. At 1505, when the torpedo boats had closed within 10,000 yards, in accordance with Captain Herricks orders and as allowed under international law at that time, Maddox fired three warning shots. Shortly after ordering the airstrikes, Johnson went on television and addressed the nation regarding the incident. By 1400 hours EDT, the president had approved retaliatory strikes against North Vietnamese naval bases for the next morning, August 5, at 0600 local time, which was 1900 EDT on August 4 in Washington. Based on the intercepts, Captain John J. Herrick, the on-scene mission commander aboard nearby Turner Joy, decided to terminate Maddoxs Desoto patrol late on August 1, because he believed he had indications the ship was about to be attacked.. In the years covered here, the Navy was generally known throughout the U.S. Mission in Saigon for being in the housekeeping business, operating supply warehouses, and running the officer clubs, PXs and other amenities, an inevitable part of the American military's baggage. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam. WebThe Gulf of Tonkin While Kennedy had at least the comforting illusion of progress in Vietnam (manufactured by Harkins and Diem), Johnson faced a starker picture of confusion, disunity, and muddle in Saigon and of a rapidly growing Viet Cong in the countryside. On 30 July, Westmoreland revised the 34A maritime operations schedule for August, increasing the number of raids by "283% over the July program and 566% over June. WebCongress repealed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution before the United States' withdrawal from Vietnam in 1973. A subsequent review of the SIGINT reports revealed that this later interceptMcNamaras smoking gunwas in fact a follow-on, more in-depth report of the August 2 action. Unlike much else that followed, this incident is undisputed, although no one from the US government ever admitted publicly that the attack was likely provoked by its covert actions. Herricks concerns grew as the SIGINT intercepts indicated that the North Vietnamese were concentrating torpedo boats off Hon Me Island, 25 nautical miles to his southwest. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. ThoughtCo, Feb. 16, 2021, thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 3 August 1964. We still seek no wider war.. The Gulf of Tonkin incident: the false flag operation that started the Vietnam war. Something Isnt Working Refresh the page to try again. Something Isnt Working This time, however, President Johnson reacted much more skeptically and ultimately decided to take no retaliatory action. Approved on Aug. 10, 1964, the Southeast Asia (Gulf of Tonkin) Resolution, gave Johnson the power to use military force in the region without requiring a declaration of war. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident took place on Aug. 2 and 4, 1964, and helped lead to greater American involvement in the Vietnam War. After the war, Hanoi officials not only acknowledged the event but deemed it important enough to designate its date, Aug. 2, as the Vietnamese Navy's Anniversary Day, "the day our heroic naval forces went out and chased away Maddox and Turner Joy." Both men believed an attack on the American ships was imminent. As far as the headlines were concerned, that was it, but the covert campaign continued unabated. Both sides, however, spent August 3 reviewing their contingency plans and analyzing lessons learned from the incident. In less than 25 minutes, the attack was over. These warning shots were fired and the P-4s launched a torpedo attack. . U.S. SIGINT support had provided ample warning of North Vietnams intentions and actions, enabling the American ship to defend itself successfully. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which have been used in these hostile operations., The next day, the president addressed Congress, seeking the power to to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.. To have a Tonkin Gulf conspiracy means that the several hundred National Security Agency and naval communications cited have been doctored. Moments later, one of the crewmen spotted a North Vietnamese Swatow patrol boat bearing down on them. Cookies collect information about your preferences and your devices and are used to make the site work as you expect it to, to understand how you interact with the site, and to show advertisements that are targeted to your interests. https://www.thoughtco.com/vietnam-war-gulf-of-tonkin-incident-2361345 (accessed March 4, 2023). Captain Herrick had been ordered to be clear of the patrol area by nightfall, so he turned due east at approximately 1600. Within days, Hanoi lodged a complaint with the International Control Commission (ICC), which had been established in 1954 to oversee the provisions of the Geneva Accords. By late July 1964, SOG had four Nasty-class patrol boats, designated. At 2000 hours local time, Maddox reported it had two surface and three aerial contacts on radar. Both South Vietnamese and U.S. maritime operators in Da Nang assumed that their raids were the cause of the mounting international crisis, and they never for a moment doubted that the North Vietnamese believed that the raids and the Desoto patrols were one and the same. Hanoi pointed out what Washington denied: "On July 30, 1964 . A brief account of the raids is in MACVSOG 1964 Command History, Annex A, 14 January 1965, pp. Neither Herricks doubts nor his reconnaissance request was well received, however. No one was hurt and little damage wasdone in the attack, but intercepted cables suggested a second attack might be imminent. It also outlined the Maddoxs path along the coast on 2 August and the 34A attacks on Vinh Son the following day. The report covers all aspects of the efforts of the various American SIGINT agencies from the early postWorld War II years through the evacuation of Saigon. In August 1964, Congress passed the Tonkin Gulf resolutionor Southeast Asia Resolution, as it is officially knownthe congressional decree that gave President Lyndon Johnson a broad mandate to wage war in Vietnam. The North Vietnamese believed that, although they had lost one boat, they had deterred an attack on their coast. Here's why he couldn't walk away. The Geneva Conference in 1954 was intended to settle outstanding issues following the end of hostilities between France and the Viet Minh at the end of the First Indochina War. In July 1964, Operational Plan 34A was taking off, but during the first six months of this highly classified program of covert attacks against North Vietnam, one after the other, missions failed, often spelling doom for the commando teams inserted into the North by boat and parachute. Neither ships crew knew about the North Vietnamese salvage operation. Carl Otis Schuster, U.S. Navy (ret.) Lyndon Johnson on August 5, 1964, assertedly in reaction to two But the administration dithered, informing the embassy only that "further OPLAN 34A operations should be held off pending review of the situation in Washington. After the Tonkin Gulf incident, the State Department cabled Seaborn, instructing him to tell the North Vietnamese that "neither the Maddox or any other destroyer was in any way associated with any attack on the DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam, or North Vietnam] islands." Media Manipulation. These secret intelligence-gathering missions and sabotage operations had begun under the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1961, but in January 1964, the program was transferred to the Defense Department under the control of a cover organization called the Studies and Observations Group (SOG). Both countries were backing North Vietnam, but so far they were staying out of the conflict and the White House wanted to keep it that way. The subsequent North Vietnamese reporting on the enemy matched the location, course and speed of Maddox. Changing course in time to evade the torpedoes, the Maddox again was attacked, this time by a boat that fired another torpedo and 14.5-mm machine guns. The after-action reports from the participants in the Gulf arrived in Washington several hours after the report of the second incident. Few areas of the world have been as hotly contested as the India-Pakistan border. It authorized the president to "prevent further aggression .
